Tyger Tyger Burning Bright

Science 4 January 2013: Vol. 339 no. 6115 pp. 96-98 DOI: 10.1126/science.1229294 REPORT The End of History Illusion Jordi Quoidbach1,2, Daniel T. Gilbert2,*, Timothy D. Wilson3 + Author Affiliations 1National Fund for Scientific Research, Brussels, Belgium. 2Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. 3Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904–4400, USA. ↵*To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: gilbert@wjh.harvard.edu ABSTRACT We measured the personalities, values, and preferences of more than 19,000 people who ranged in age from 18 to 68 and asked them to report how much they had changed in the past decade and/or to predict how much they would change in the next decade. Young people, middle-aged people, and older people all believed they had changed a lot in the past but would change relatively little in the future. People, it seems, regard the present as a watershed moment at which they have finally become the person they will be for the rest of their lives. This “end of history illusion” had practical consequences, leading people to overpay for future opportunities to indulge their current preferences. At every stage of life, people make decisions that profoundly influence the lives of the people they will become—and when they finally become those people, they aren’t always thrilled about it. Young adults pay to remove the tattoos that teenagers paid to get, middle-aged adults rush to divorce the people whom young adults rushed to marry, and older adults visit health spas to lose what middle-aged adults visited restaurants to gain. Why do people so often make decisions that their future selves regret? One possibility is that people have a fundamental misconception about their future selves. Time is a powerful force that transforms people’s preferences, reshapes their values, and alters their personalities, and we suspect that people generally underestimate the magnitude of those changes. In other words, people may believe that who they are today is pretty much who they will be tomorrow, despite the fact that it isn’t who they were yesterday. In the studies we describe here, we showed that people expect to change little in the future, despite knowing that they have changed a lot in the past, and that this tendency bedevils their decision-making. We call this tendency to underestimate the magnitude of future change the “end of history illusion.” To investigate this phenomenon, we asked samples of people who varied widely in age to predict how much they would change over the next 10 years, we asked similar samples to report how much they had changed over the past 10 years, and we compared the predictions of people aged a years to the reports of people aged a +10 years. We expected people aged a years to predict less change over the next 10 years than people aged a +10 years reported over the past 10 years. We used this strategy to study how much people thought they would change in the domains of personality (a person’s characteristic patterns of behavior), core values (a person’s ideals and principles), and preferences (a person’s likes and dislikes). In study 1, we sought to determine whether people underestimate the extent to which their personalities will change in the future. We recruited a sample of 7519 adults ranging in age from 18 to 68 years [mean (M) = 40 years, standard deviation (SD) = 11.3 years, 80% women] through the Web site of a popular television show and asked them to complete the Ten Item Personality Inventory (1), which is a standard measure of the five trait dimensions that underlie human personality (i.e., conscientiousness, agreeableness, emotional stability, openness to experience, and extraversion). Participants were then randomly assigned either to the reporter condition (and were asked to complete the measure as they would have completed it 10 years earlier) or the predictor condition (and were asked to complete the measure as they thought they would complete it 10 years hence). We then computed the absolute value of the difference between participants’ ratings of their current personality and their reported or predicted personality and averaged these across the five traits to create a measure of reported or predicted change in personality. Additional methodological details about study 1 can be found in supplementary text 1 to 3. We analyzed these measures by first assigning a value to each of the 41 10-year periods between ages 18 and 68. We called this variable “decade.” For each decade, we compared the predictions of predictors aged a to the reports of reporters aged a + 10 years. So, for example, when decade = 1, we compared 18-year-old predictors and 28-year-old reporters; when decade = 2, we compared 19-year-old predictors and 29-year-old reporters; and so on. We did not collect data from reporters who were younger than 28 years, because in our sample there were no predictors younger than 18 years with whom to compare them, and we did not collect data from predictors who were older than 58 years, because in our sample there were no reporters older than 68 years with whom to compare them. We entered participants’ reported or predicted changes in personality into a multiple regression analysis with three predictor variables: decade (coded 1 through 41), condition (coded 1 for predictors and –1 for reporters), and a “decade X condition” interaction. First, the analysis revealed an effect of decade [beta coefficient (β) = –0.13, P < 0.001], indicating that the older the participants were, the less personality change they reported or predicted. This finding is consistent with a large body of research showing that personality becomes more stable as people age (2). Second, the analysis revealed the expected effect of condition (β = –0.14, P < 0.001). The top panel of Fig. 1 shows this end of history illusion: Predictors aged a predicted that they would change less over the next decade than reporters aged a + 10 years reported having changed over the same decade. Finally, there was no decade X condition interaction (β = 0.01, P = 0.68), indicating that the magnitude of the end of history illusion did not change across decades. Next, we conducted follow-up studies to answer three questions. View larger version: In this page In a new window Download PowerPoint Slide for Teaching Fig. 1 Standardized predicted and reported changes across decades in study 1 (top panel), study 2 (middle panel), and study 3 (bottom panel). The graph shows moving averages smoothed with a 4-year Gaussian filter. Additional information about this figure can be found in supplementary text 4. First, is it possible that the discrepancy between participants’ reports and predictions in study 1 was due entirely to the erroneous memory of reporters, who may have overestimated how much they had changed in the past 10 years, rather than to the erroneous predictions of predictors, who may have underestimated how much they would change in the next 10 years? To investigate this possibility, we compared the magnitudes of the predicted and reported personality changes in our sample to the magnitude of actual personality change observed in an independent sample of 3808 adults ranging from 20 to 75 years old (M = 47.2 years, SD = 12.4 years, 55% women), whose personalities had been measured as part of the MacArthur Foundation Survey of Midlife Development in the United States (MIDUS). These adults completed the MIDUS Big Five scale (3) for the first time in 1995–1996 (MIDUS 1) and for a second time in 2004–2006 (MIDUS 2). The MIDUS Big Five scale has good construct validity and correlates with other similar scales (4, 5). Because the personality measures used in the MIDUS study and in our study were scored on different scales, direct comparison of the data was not possible. To estimate the magnitudes of actual, reported, and predicted personality change, we computed intraclass correlations (ICC-A1), which account for both absolute and rank-based change (6). Specifically, we computed (i) the ICC between the two administrations of the personality test in the MIDUS sample, which was 0.52; (ii) the ICC between current and reported personality for participants in our sample, which was 0.51; and (iii) the ICC between current and predicted personality for participants in our sample, which was 0.65. Larger ICCs, of course, indicate less personality change. As inspection of these ICCs reveals, the magnitude of reported personality change in our sample was almost identical to the magnitude of actual personality change in the MIDUS sample, suggesting that participants in our sample were relatively accurate when reporting the amount of change they had experienced in the past. However, the magnitude of actual personality change in the MIDUS sample was substantially larger than the magnitude of predicted personality change in our sample, suggesting that participants in our sample were relatively inaccurate when predicting the amount of change they would experience in the future. In short, it seems likely that the discrepancy between the reported and predicted personality changes of participants in study 1 is due at least in part to errors of prediction and not merely to errors of memory. Study 3 provides further support for this claim. Second, is it possible that reporters and predictors in study 1 interpreted the scales differently, so that words such as “conscientious” or “agreeable” meant one thing to reporters and another thing to predictors? To investigate this possibility, we replicated study 1 with an independent sample of 613 adults (M = 40.5 years, SD = 8.4 years, 86.6% women) recruited through the same Web site and using a design in which each participant was assigned to both the reporter and the predictor conditions, thus ensuring that any idiosyncratic interpretation of the scales would influence both conditions equally. This design required that we restrict our sample to participants aged 28 to 58. Because participants contributed data to both conditions, we performed a multilevel version of the analysis described in study 1. The analysis revealed the expected effect of condition (β = –7.69, P = 0.001), indicating that predictors aged a years predicted that they would change less over the next decade than reporters aged a + 10 years reported having changed over the same decade—even though the reports and predictions were made by the same participants. This finding suggests that idiosyncratic interpretations of the scale are not the cause of the effects seen in study 1. Third, is it possible that predictors in study 1 knew that they would change over the next 10 years, but because they did not know exactly how they would change, they did not feel confident predicting specific changes? To investigate this possibility, we replicated study 1 with an independent sample of 1163 adults (M = 38.4 years, SD = 12.1 years, 78% women) recruited through the same Web site. Instead of being asked to report or predict their specific personality traits, these participants were simply asked to report how much they felt they had “changed as a person over the last 10 years” and how much they thought they would “change as a person over the next 10 years.” Because some participants contributed data to both conditions, we performed a multilevel version of the analysis described in study 1. The analysis revealed the expected effect of condition (β = –0.74, P = 0.007), indicating that predictors aged a years predicted that they would change less over the next decade than reporters aged a + 10 years reported having changed over the same decade. This finding suggests that a lack of specific knowledge about how one might change in the future was not the cause of the effects seen in study 1. In study 2, we sought to determine whether the end of history illusion was limited to the domain of personality, and so we repeated our procedure in the domain of core values. We recruited a new sample of 2717 adults ranging in age from 18 to 68 years (M = 38.6 years, SD = 10.6 years, 82% women) through the same Web site and asked them to indicate the importance of each of 10 basic values (such as hedonism, success, security, etc.) that were taken from the Schwartz Value Inventory (7). Otherwise, the design was identical to that of study 1. We performed a regression analysis similar to the one performed in study 1. First, the analysis revealed an effect of decade (β = –0.23, P < 0.0010, indicating that the older participants were, the less change in their core values they reported or predicted. Second, the analysis revealed the expected effect of condition (β = –0.46, P < 0.001). The middle panel of Fig. 1 shows this end of history illusion: Predictors aged a years predicted that they would change less over the next decade than reporters aged a + 10 years reported having changed over the same decade. Finally, the analysis revealed a decade × condition interaction (β = 0.08, P < 0.001). Although the magnitude of the end of history illusion decreased as participants got older, it was nonetheless present even in the oldest group of participants (aged 50 and up) (β = –0.34, P < 0.001). Further discussion of this decade × condition interaction can be found in supplementary text 5. The foregoing studies show that people expect to experience less change in their personalities and core values over the next decade than people a decade older report having experienced over the past decade. The analysis presented in study 1 suggests that this discrepancy represents, at least in part, an error of prediction and is not merely an error of memory. To provide further support for this claim, in study 3 we examined the end of history illusion in a domain in which memory was likely to be highly reliable. Rather than asking reporters to remember how extraverted they had been or how much they had once valued honesty, we asked them to remember simple facts about their strongest preferences, such as the name of their favorite musical band or the name of their best friend. We reasoned that if participants remembered having a different best friend 10 years ago but expected to have the same best friend 10 years from now, then this was probably not due to a pervasive tendency for people of all ages to actually keep their best friends but mistakenly remember changing them. To test this hypothesis, we recruited a new sample of 7130 adults ranging from 18 to 68 years old (M = 40.2 years, SD = 11.1 years, 80% women) through the same Web site and asked them to report their favorite type of music, their favorite type of vacation, their favorite type of food, their favorite hobby, and the name of their best friend. Participants were then randomly assigned either to the reporter condition (and were asked to report whether each of their current preferences was the same as or different than it was 10 years ago) or the predictor condition (and were asked to predict whether each of their current preferences would be the same or different 10 years from now). We then counted the number of items on which participants responded “different” and used this as a measure of reported or predicted changes in preference. We performed a regression analysis similar to the ones performed in studies 1 and 2. First, the analysis revealed an effect of decade (β = –0.14, P < 0.001). The older participants were, the less change in preferences they reported or predicted. Second, the analysis revealed the expected effect of condition (β = –0.19, P < 0.001). The bottom panel in Fig. 1 shows this end of history illusion: Predictors aged a years predicted that their preferences would change less over the next decade than reporters aged a + 10 years reported that their preferences had changed over the same decade. Finally, the analysis revealed a decade × condition interaction (β = 0.07, P < 0.001). Although the magnitude of the end of history illusion decreased as participants got older, it was nonetheless present even in the oldest group of participants (aged 50 and up) (β = –0.08, P < 0.01). Further discussion of this decade × condition interaction can be found in supplementary text 5, and additional details about study 3 can be found in supplementary text 6. The foregoing studies suggest that people underestimate the extent to which their personalities, values, and preferences will change in the future. In study 4, we sought to show that this end of history illusion can have practical consequences. Specifically, we sought to show that because people overestimate the stability of their current preferences, they will overpay for future opportunities to indulge them. In study 4, we recruited a new sample of 170 adults ranging from 18 to 64 years old (M = 34.9 years, SD = 10.6 years, 52% women) through the Amazon Mechanical Turk Web site (8, 9). Some participants were randomly assigned to the “future concert” condition. These participants were asked to name their current favorite musical band and then to report the maximum amount of money they thought they would be willing to pay today in order to see that band perform in 10 years. Other participants were randomly assigned to the “present concert” condition. These participants were asked to name the musical band that was their favorite 10 years ago and then to report the amount of money that they thought they would be willing to pay today to see that band perform in the coming week. We performed a regression analysis similar to the ones performed in studies 1, 2, and 3. First, the analysis revealed the expected effect of condition (β = 0.16, P < 0.05). Participants aged a years thought they would pay 61% more to see their current favorite band perform 10 years in the future (M = $129) than participants aged a + 10 years thought they would pay to see their once-favorite band perform in the present (M = $80). The analysis revealed no effect of decade (β = –0.06, P = 0.41), indicating that the price participants thought they would pay did not vary with age, and no decade × condition interaction (β = 0.01, P = 0.94), indicating that willingness to pay more for a future concert than a present concert did not diminish in magnitude as participants got older. In short, participants substantially overpaid for a future opportunity to indulge a current preference. Across six studies of more than 19,000 participants, we found consistent evidence to indicate that people underestimate how much they will change in the future, and that doing so can lead to suboptimal decisions. Although these data cannot tell us what causes the end of history illusion, two possibilities seem likely. First, most people believe that their personalities are attractive, their values admirable, and their preferences wise (10); and having reached that exalted state, they may be reluctant to entertain the possibility of change. People also like to believe that they know themselves well (11), and the possibility of future change may threaten that belief. In short, people are motivated to think well of themselves and to feel secure in that understanding, and the end of history illusion may help them accomplish these goals. Second, there is at least one important difference between the cognitive processes that allow people to look forward and backward in time (12). Prospection is a constructive process, retrospection is a reconstructive process, and constructing new things is typically more difficult than reconstructing old ones (13, 14). The reason this matters is that people often draw inferences from the ease with which they can remember or imagine (15, 16). If people find it difficult to imagine the ways in which their traits, values, or preferences will change in the future, they may assume that such changes are unlikely. In short, people may confuse the difficulty of imagining personal change with the unlikelihood of change itself. Although the magnitude of this end of history illusion in some of our studies was greater for younger people than for older people, it was nonetheless evident at every stage of adult life that we could analyze. Both teenagers and grandparents seem to believe that the pace of personal change has slowed to a crawl and that they have recently become the people they will remain. History, it seems, is always ending today. Supplementary Materials www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/339/6115/96/DC1 Supplementary Text Table S1 Received for publication 24 August 2012. Accepted for publication 16 November 2012. References and Notes ↵ S. D. Gosling, P. J. Rentfrow, W. B. Swann Jr., A very brief measure of the Big-Five personality domains. J. Res. Pers. 37, 504 (2003). CrossRefWeb of Science ↵ B. W. Roberts, K. E. Walton, W. Viechtbauer, Patterns of mean-level change in personality traits across the life course: A meta-analysis of longitudinal studies. Psychol. Bull. 132, 1 (2006). CrossRefMedlineWeb of Science ↵ M. E. Lachman, S. L. Weaver, The Midlife Development Inventory (MIDI) Personality Scales: Scale Construction and Scoring (Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, 1997). ↵ D. K. Mroczek, C. M. Kolarz, The effect of age on positive and negative affect: A developmental perspective on happiness. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 75, 1333 (1998). CrossRefMedlineWeb of Science ↵ K. M. Prenda, M. E. Lachman, Planning for the future: A life management strategy for increasing control and life satisfaction in adulthood. Psychol. Aging 16, 206 (2001). CrossRefMedlineWeb of Science ↵ K. O. McGraw, S. P. Wong, Forming inferences about some intraclass correlation coefficients. Psychol. Methods 1, 30 (1996). CrossRefWeb of Science ↵ S. H. Schwartz, in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, M. P. Zanna, Ed. (Academic Press, Orlando, FL, 1992), vol. 25, pp. 1–65. ↵ G. Paolacci, J. Chandler, P. G. Ipeirotis, Running experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 5, 411 (2010). Search Google Scholar ↵ M. Buhrmester, T. Kwang, S. D. Gosling, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 6, 3 (2011). Abstract/FREE Full Text ↵ C. Sedikides, M. D. Alicke, in The Oxford Handbook of Human Motivation, R. M. Ryan, Ed. (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford), pp. 303–322. ↵ W. B. Swann Jr., in Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, P. Van Lang, A. Kruglanski, E. T. Higgins, Eds. (Sage, London, 2012), pp. 23–42. ↵ D. R. Addis, A. T. Wong, D. L. Schacter, Remembering the past and imagining the future: Common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and elaboration. Neuropsychologia 45, 1363 (2007). CrossRefMedlineWeb of Science ↵ M. D. Robinson, G. L. Clore, Belief and feeling: Evidence for an accessibility model of emotional self-report. Psychol. Bull. 128, 934 (2002). CrossRefMedlineWeb of Science ↵ M. Ross, Relation of implicit theories to the construction of personal histories. Psychol. Rev. 96, 341 (1989). CrossRef ↵ N. Schwarzet al., Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 61, 195 (1991). CrossRefWeb of Science ↵ A. Tversky, D. Kahneman, Availability: A heuristic for judgment frequency and probability. Cognit. Psychol. 5, 207 (1973). CrossRefWeb of Science Acknowledgments: We acknowledge the support of Research Grant BCS-0722132 from NSF to D.T.G. and T.D.W.. Raw data from all studies are on deposit at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (deposit no. 32668) and can be accessed at www.icpsr.umich.edu.

BBC News MAGAZINE 3 January 2013 Last updated at 19:32 ET Does confidence really breed success? COMMENTS (495) By William Kremer BBC World Service Research suggests that more and more American university students think they are something special. High self-esteem is generally regarded as a good thing - but could too much of it actually make you less successful? About nine million young people have filled out the American Freshman Survey, since it began in 1966. It asks students to rate how they measure up to their peers in a number of basic skills areas - and over the past four decades, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of students who describe themselves as being "above average" for academic ability, drive to achieve, mathematical ability and self-confidence. This was revealed in a new analysis of the survey data, by US psychologist Jean Twenge and colleagues. Self-appraisals of traits that are less individualistic - such as co-operativeness, understanding others and spirituality - saw little change, or a decrease, over the same period. Twenge adds that while the Freshman Survey shows that students are increasingly likely to label themselves as gifted in writing ability, objective test scores indicate that actual writing ability has gone down since the 1960s. And while in the late 1980s, almost half of students said they studied for six or more hours a week, the figure was little over a third by 2009 - a fact that sits rather oddly, given there has been a rise in students' self-proclaimed drive to succeed during the same period. Another study by Twenge suggested there has been a 30% tilt towards narcissistic attitudes in US students since 1979. The Oxford English Dictionary defines narcissism as: "Excessive self-love or vanity; self-admiration, self-centredness." "Our culture used to encourage modesty and humility and not bragging about yourself," says Twenge. "It was considered a bad thing to be seen as conceited or full of yourself." Not everyone with high self-esteem is a narcissist. Some positive views of the self may be harmless and in fact quite justified. But one in four recent students responded to a questionnaire, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory, in a way which leaned towards narcissistic views of the self. Though some have argued that narcissism is an essential trait, Twenge and her colleagues see it as negative and destructive. In The Narcissism Epidemic, co-written with Keith Campbell, Twenge blames the growth of narcissistic attitudes on a range of trends - including parenting styles, celebrity culture, social media and access to easy credit, which allows people to appear more successful than they are. "What's really become prevalent over the last two decades is the idea that being highly self-confident - loving yourself, believing in yourself - is the key to success. "Now the interesting thing about that belief is it's widely held, it's very deeply held, and it's also untrue." This bewitching idea - that people's lives will improve with their self-esteem - led to what came to be known as The Self-Esteem Movement. Legions of self-help books have propagated the idea that we each have it within us to achieve great things - we just need to be more confident. Over 15,000 journal articles have examined the links between high self-esteem and measurable outcomes in real life, such as educational achievement, job opportunities, popularity, health, happiness and adherence to laws and social codes. Yet there is very little evidence that raising self-esteem leads to tangible, positive outcomes. "If there is any effect at all, it is quite small," says Roy Baumeister of Florida State University. He was the lead author of a 2003 paper that scrutinised dozens of self-esteem studies. He found that although high self-esteem frequently had a positive correlation with success, the direction of causation was often unclear. For example, are high marks awarded to people with high self-esteem or does getting high marks engender high self-esteem? And a third variable can influence both self-esteem and the positive outcome. "Coming from a good family might lead to both high self-esteem and personal success," says Baumeister. "Self-control is much more powerful and well-supported as a cause of personal success. Despite my years invested in research on self-esteem, I reluctantly advise people to forget about it." This doesn't mean that under-confident people will be more successful in school, in their careers or in sport. "You need to believe that you can go out and do something but that's not the same as thinking that you're great," says Twenge. She gives the example of a swimmer attempting to learn a turn - this person needs to believe that they can acquire that skill, but a belief that they are already a great swimmer does not help. Forsyth and Kerr studied the effect of positive feedback on university students who had received low grades (C, D, E and F). They found that the weaker students actually performed worse if they received encouragement aimed at boosting their self-worth. "An intervention that encourages [students] to feel good about themselves, regardless of work, may remove the reason to work hard," writes Baumeister. So do young people think they are better than they are? If they are, perhaps the appropriate response is not condemnation but pity. The narcissists described by Twenge and Campbell are often outwardly charming and charismatic. They find it easy to start relationships and have more confidence socially and in job interviews. Yet their prognosis is not good. "In the long-term, what tends to happen is that narcissistic people mess up their relationships, at home and at work," says Twenge. Narcissists may say all the right things but their actions eventually reveal them to be self-serving. As for the narcissists themselves, it often not until middle age that they notice their life has been marked by an unusual number of failed relationships. But it's not something that is easy to fix - narcissists are notorious for dropping out of therapy. "It's a personality trait," says Twenge. "It's by definition very difficult to change. It's rooted in genetics and early environment and culture and things that aren't all that malleable." Things also don't look good for the many young people who - although not classed as narcissists - have a disproportionately positive self-view. A 2006 study led by John Reynolds of Florida State University found that students are increasingly ambitious, but also increasingly unrealistic in their expectations, creating what he calls "ambition inflation". "Since the 1960s and 1970s, when those expectations started to grow, there's been an increase in anxiety and depression," says Twenge. "There's going to be a lot more people who don't reach their goals." Jean Twenge spoke to Health Check on the BBC World Service. You can listen to the programme or download the Health Check podcast. You can follow the Magazine on Twitter and on Facebook Your comments (495) Comments This entry is now closed for comments Jump to comments pagination Editors' PicksAll Comments (495) +7 Comment number 402. strothermartin 4TH JANUARY 2013 - 14:58 I think anyone with teenage children will tell you that, outwardly, they are full of confidence. Inwardly, they are just as full of angst as we ever were at their age. And let`s be honest here, I`d rather my daughter be confident in herself than have low self-esteem. +10 Comment number 401. ace00017 4TH JANUARY 2013 - 14:57 I started University in 2011 and in the first few weeks I met so many people who thought they were "geniuses" and were already talking about doing MAs and PhDs. Throughout the year they did miminmal work and by the start of Year 2 I discovered most of these "geniuses" had failed their first year and dropped out. This goes shows that determination and hard work are more important than condfidence +15 Comment number 399. tellithowitis 4TH JANUARY 2013 - 14:57 Working in mental health, I am aware that encouraging children to develop a sense of self based on how they compare to others can lead to problems for them and those around them. Instead of emphasising self-esteem, we need to help children develop compassion (for self and others) and to understand they are no better and no worse than others. Research backs this up. +9 Comment number 281. Sjeh76 4TH JANUARY 2013 - 13:10 I doubt it, or at least, not on it's own. Hard work and self-awareness are probably far more effective. The problem with confidence is that it's very easily misplaced, or even unjustified. Being aware of your capabilities and limits is much more useful, in my opinion. Simply 'believing in yourself' to the degree where the world suddenly becomes your oyster is self-delusion and is best avoided. +4 Comment number 274. Fairplay100 4TH JANUARY 2013 - 13:08 Locally in Sussex, the one reason I hear more than any other, for paying for private education rather than state, is that parents hope that their children will gain confidence. Public-speaking and leadership skills are so important. I am amazed how far people with confidence progress in their career. I often had far better qualifications, but lacked the confidence to achieve what I wanted. Comments 5 of 17 Show More Sign in with your BBC iD, or Register to comment and rate comments All posts are reactively-moderated and must obey the house rules. BBC © 2013 The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites. Read more.

NYT January 3, 2013 Why You Won’t Be the Person You Expect to Be By JOHN TIERNEY When we remember our past selves, they seem quite different. We know how much our personalities and tastes have changed over the years. But when we look ahead, somehow we expect ourselves to stay the same, a team of psychologists said Thursday, describing research they conducted of people’s self-perceptions. They called this phenomenon the “end of history illusion,” in which people tend to “underestimate how much they will change in the future.” According to their research, which involved more than 19,000 people ages 18 to 68, the illusion persists from teenage years into retirement. “Middle-aged people — like me — often look back on our teenage selves with some mixture of amusement and chagrin,” said one of the authors, Daniel T. Gilbert, a psychologist at Harvard. “What we never seem to realize is that our future selves will look back and think the very same thing about us. At every age we think we’re having the last laugh, and at every age we’re wrong.” Other psychologists said they were intrigued by the findings, published Thursday in the journal Science, and were impressed with the amount of supporting evidence. Participants were asked about their personality traits and preferences — their favorite foods, vacations, hobbies and bands — in years past and present, and then asked to make predictions for the future. Not surprisingly, the younger people in the study reported more change in the previous decade than did the older respondents. But when asked to predict what their personalities and tastes would be like in 10 years, people of all ages consistently played down the potential changes ahead. Thus, the typical 20-year-old woman’s predictions for her next decade were not nearly as radical as the typical 30-year-old woman’s recollection of how much she had changed in her 20s. This sort of discrepancy persisted among respondents all the way into their 60s. And the discrepancy did not seem to be because of faulty memories, because the personality changes recalled by people jibed quite well with independent research charting how personality traits shift with age. People seemed to be much better at recalling their former selves than at imagining how much they would change in the future. Why? Dr. Gilbert and his collaborators, Jordi Quoidbach of Harvard and Timothy D. Wilson of the University of Virginia, had a few theories, starting with the well-documented tendency of people to overestimate their own wonderfulness. “Believing that we just reached the peak of our personal evolution makes us feel good,” Dr. Quoidbach said. “The ‘I wish that I knew then what I know now’ experience might give us a sense of satisfaction and meaning, whereas realizing how transient our preferences and values are might lead us to doubt every decision and generate anxiety.” Or maybe the explanation has more to do with mental energy: predicting the future requires more work than simply recalling the past. “People may confuse the difficulty of imagining personal change with the unlikelihood of change itself,” the authors wrote in Science. The phenomenon does have its downsides, the authors said. For instance, people make decisions in their youth — about getting a tattoo, say, or a choice of spouse — that they sometimes come to regret. And that illusion of stability could lead to dubious financial expectations, as the researchers showed in an experiment asking people how much they would pay to see their favorite bands. When asked about their favorite band from a decade ago, respondents were typically willing to shell out $80 to attend a concert of the band today. But when they were asked about their current favorite band and how much they would be willing to spend to see the band’s concert in 10 years, the price went up to $129. Even though they realized that favorites from a decade ago like Creed or the Dixie Chicks have lost some of their luster, they apparently expect Coldplay and Rihanna to blaze on forever. “The end-of-history effect may represent a failure in personal imagination,” said Dan P. McAdams, a psychologist at Northwestern who has done separate research into the stories people construct about their past and future lives. He has often heard people tell complex, dynamic stories about the past but then make vague, prosaic projections of a future in which things stay pretty much the same. Dr. McAdams was reminded of a conversation with his 4-year-old daughter during the craze for Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles in the 1980s. When he told her they might not be her favorite thing one day, she refused to acknowledge the possibility. But later, in her 20s, she confessed to him that some part of her 4-year-old mind had realized he might be right. “She resisted the idea of change, as it dawned on her at age 4, because she could not imagine what else she would ever substitute for the Turtles,” Dr. McAdams said. “She had a sneaking suspicion that she would change, but she couldn’t quite imagine how, so she stood with her assertion of continuity. Maybe something like this goes on with all of us.”